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Creating a Unified Europe:
Maastricht and Beyond
The Treaty on European Union, popularly called the Maastricht Treaty, was
signed in February of 1992 and entered into force on November 1, 1993.' The
Treaty represents an ambitious effort to create an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe2 and marks the European Community's most far-reaching step
since the EEC Treaty.3 The Maastricht Treaty changes the nature of the Community
and takes it one step closer to a federal union. The Community's primary goal will
no longer be tied exclusively to the economic area, but will expand to involve goals
and objectives previously reserved for Member States. With such dramatic increase
in the scope of the Community, it is no surprise that ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty became the center of controversy in Europe and produced more divergence
rather than the desired unity among Member States.
The purpose of this article is to examine the potential of the Maastricht Treaty
to aid in the creation of a unified Europe. The absence of consensus over the
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1. Presidency Sums up the New European Union, EC Update (CCH), Nov. 11, 1993, at 1.
2. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [MAASTRICHT TREATY] art. A. The Treaty contains a mass
of amendments to the three constitutive treaties of the European Community: the ECSC Treaty, the
Euratom Treaty, and the EEC Treaty. Most significantly, the Maastricht Treaty affects the EEC
Treaty that has already been amended by the Merger Treaty and the Single European Act.
3. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY].
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direction of the Community, as well as the turmoil over the ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty, reflect the few opportunities of various interest groups and
individuals to be heard in the Community. A unified Europe will result in increased
opportunities for the various constituent interests to participate in Community
affairs. Increased participation will ensure that those who have voiced dissatisfac-
tion regarding their role in the Community (the European Parliament, Member
State Governments, and individuals) become represented in Community actions
and policies. This article will analyze how the Maastricht Treaty will expand
the opportunities of the European Parliament, Member State Governments, and
individuals to participate in Community decision making.
I. Background
The division over the contents of the Treaty was painfully clear throughout the
ratification process. The United Kingdom secured an exemption from the new social-
policy agenda of the Community. Member States concluded an agreement on social
policy without the United Kingdom.4 Many Member States secured separate proto-
cols relating to other issues. In addition, the Danish and French referendums over
the Maastricht Treaty demonstrated the increasing dissatisfaction over the Commu-
nity.6 In Germany, ratification was delayed because of several appeals filed in the
German Constitutional Court challenging the compatibility of the Maastricht Treaty
with German sovereignty and the German Constitution. In October 1993 the Court
unanimously ruled in favor of ratification.7 A poll of German government officials
discovered that the appeals "reflect the malaise of a public frustrated and annoyed
at not having been directly consulted on the Maastricht Treaty. "'
4. MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, Protocol on Social Policy & Agreement on Social Policy
Concluded Between the Member States of the European Community with the Exception of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. As a result, the United Kingdom will not participate
in creating or passing social instruments. Any social legislation passed will not apply to the United
Kingdom. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., EC Employment Law After Maastricht: "Continental Social
Europe?", 27 INT'L LAW. 1, 7-11 (1993).
5. See, e.g., MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, Protocol on the Acquisition of Property in
Denmark (concerning acquisition of second homes in Denmark), Protocol on Portugal (concerning
Portugal's autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira), Protocol on France (concerning the privilege
of monetary emission in French overseas territories).
6. Denmark's first referendum in June 1992 placed the future of the Treaty in doubt when the
Danes narrowly voted down the Treaty. The Danes approved the Treaty in another referendum in
May 1993. The French voted in favor of the Treaty in a referendum in September 1992, but with
a narrow margin: 51.05% in favor, 48.95% against.
7. The Union Treaty: What Will It Change?, EC Update (CCH), Oct. 28, 1993, at 1. To the
complaint that the European Community as envisioned by the Maastricht Treaty dissolves German
sovereignty, the Court stated that the treaty creates a league of states, "each of which preserves
its national identity while sharing many once-sovereign powers." Last Harrumph for Maastricht,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1993, at 52.
8. Jahabar Sadiq, Fear of Sovereignty Being Undermined, Bus. TIMES (Malaysia), July 7, 1993.
The intergovernmental negotiations that led to the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty were conducted
in secrecy, ignoring the "basic requirements of a democracy, namely transparency, information and
public discussion." Deirdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and
Pieces, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 17, 18 (1993).
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The Maastricht Treaty has been not only a source of dissatisfaction over the
direction of Europe's future, but also a catalyst for expressions of dissatisfaction
over the Community on a larger scale. Some doubt whether the goal of a unified
Europe is attainable within the existing Community structure. Member State govern-
ments frequently resist Community action by delaying or failing to implement Com-
munity legislation. The resistance stems from the Community's power structure.
Sovereignty and power flow from the national level to the central institutions of the
Community. The bottom-up power transfer depletes power at the national level. A
considerable percentage of national laws originates or is directly handed down by
the Community. Member State governments can only watch while their sovereignty
over an increasing number of subject areas is channeled to the Community headquar-
ters in Brussels. The Community has had to increase its enforcement arsenal to
bring rebelling states in line with Community agendas. To the outside world, Europe
may appear unified, but inside, the voices of dissent and discord are becoming
louder. The situation is reminiscent of the "Europessimism" or "Euroschlerosis"
of the early 1980s when many lost faith in the European institutions.9
A unified Europe is an attainable goal, but it requires that the Community respond
to the voices of dissatisfaction, and that the Community become more open to
increased participation from its diverse constituent interests. At the level of the
central Community institutions, the legislative process must be reformed to become
more responsive to the European Parliament's input. At the Member State level,
the Community must respect the diversity of its members and recognize that certain
goals are best achieved by local action. Finally, more opportunities to participate
in and learn about Community affairs should be provided to the European citizen.
Increased participation at all three levels would only yield positive results
in European integration. First, increased participation would help reduce the
notorious "democratic deficit" in the Community. The current democratic deficit
is the result of the Community organization that operates like no other democratic
government in the world. The Community legislative process does not follow
the traditional separation-of-powers scheme but combines elements of the pro-
cesses of international organizations and a federal legislature.'° As a result, the
elected institution of the Community, the European Parliament, is considerably
weaker than the executive institutions. In general, legislative process is very
efficient, but at the same time fails to include the European Parliament in a
meaningful way. Legislation may be passed against the majority opinion of the
Parliament. The Maastricht Treaty contains amendments that increase the powers
of the European Parliament, thereby decreasing the democratic deficit.
Second, increased participation would increase the legitimacy of Community
9. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Act, 45 INT'L ORG. 1 (Winter
1991); Gregory F. Treverton, The Year of European (Dis) Unification, 91 CURRENT HIST. 353 (Nov.
1992); Walter Goldstein, Europe After Maastricht, 71 FoREIGN AFF. 117 (Winter 1992/93); Richard
C. Longworth, The Road to 1992: What a Long, Difficult Trip It's Been, 1 EUR. 6 (Jan./Feb. 1992).
10. John T. Lang, The Development of European Community Constitutional Law, 25 INT'L LAW.
455, 460-61 (1991).
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goals and institutions. The legitimacy of a governing body depends on whether
the governing body is generally recognized as a valid authority. The less willing
individuals and Member States are to abide by Community actions, the less
legitimate the Community's authority becomes. Those who believe that their
interests and inputs are not represented or considered will be less willing to accept
the results. Increasing the opportunities to participate and to be heard would
assure that the end result, favorable or not, includes a consideration of the interests
represented, because those whose interests were represented are more likely to
cooperate and consent to the results. The Community represents interests that
are diverse both in strength and size. Small interest groups that may have had
a chance to influence decisions at the national level are squeezed out when action
is taken at the Community level, because the group may lack resources or the
necessary strength in size. The Maastricht Treaty contains amendments that will
increase citizen and Member State participation in the Community and help restore
sorely needed legitimacy to Community actions.
Finally, increased participation at all three levels would increase the account-
ability of those who make the decisions. When a decisionmaker has to respond
and deal with an increased number of interests, the decisionmaker must become
sensitive to reach a decision that satisfies the largest number of interests repre-
sented. Otherwise, it is unlikely that the decisionmaker will maintain popular
support. In the Community, increased participation of the European Parliament
would force the Commission and Council to become more accountable. Further-
more, in areas where Member States have diffuse and fragmented interests, the
proper decisionmaker should become the local governments to avoid imposing
European-wide standards that ultimately satisfy nobody. When the decisionmaker
is brought as close as possible to the people, the accountability of the deci-
sionmaker increases. The European Commissioner in Brussels rarely, if ever,
has the chance to discuss a new law proposal relating to social issues with a
Greek worker that the legislation affects. The Maastricht Treaty contains the
principle of subsidiarity that has the potential to increase decisionmaking at the
local level.
Some argue that increased opportunities to participate would slow down the
progress and efficiency of the Community. This argument mischaracterizes the
causal relationship between participation on one side and progress on the other.
It is the Community's emphasis on fast and efficient progress that has led to the
erosion of opportunities to participate in the Community and to the failure to
reach a unified Europe. Increasing participation on all fronts in the Community
may indeed slow down progress, but will create more satisfied constituents.
Increased participation will create a unified Europe that fully supports any prog-
ress made-slow as it may be. Those who insist on fast integration may ultimately
destroy any hope of a unified Europe. A unified Europe will be the result of
increasing the opportunities of a larger group of interests to become involved
and to influence Community affairs.
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II. Increasing Participation at the Community Level:
New Powers of the European Parliament
The current legislative process in the Community fails to provide the European
Parliament with adequate opportunities to fully participate in and influence Com-
munity legislation. The European Parliament is a curious anomaly in the Commu-
nity structure. It is the only institution elected by universal suffrage; it comprises
over 500 representatives and their staff and yet has no genuine power to represent
and respond to the interests of the electorate. Its role is mostly advisory and
consultative. Community legislation may be passed against the majority view of
the Parliament. The Maastricht Treaty contains provisions that have the potential
to increase the role of the Parliament in the Community. The purpose of this
section is to examine the role of the Parliament in the current legislative process
and to evaluate how the Maastricht Treaty will expand the role of the Parliament
in the Community's legislative process.
A. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
The key institutions in the legislative process are the Commission, the Council
of Ministers, and the European Parliament. In a nutshell, the European Commis-
sion proposes legislation, and the Council of Ministers passes legislation after
consulting the European Parliament." The Community has three types of law:
treaties, regulations, and directives. A regulation is binding and directly applica-
ble in Member States.' 2 A directive is binding, but leaves the choice of form
and methods of implementation to the Member States within a deadline. 13 A
regulation is comparable to a national law, whereas a directive must be incorpo-
rated into national law by the Member State legislature. 4
Proposals for regulations and directives are initiated in the Commission. 5 The
Commission has a monopoly power over law proposals. The Council may request
the Commission to submit a legislative proposal, but there is no mechanism to
11. Directorate-General for Information and Public Relations of the European Parliament, The
European Parliament 10, Cat. No. AX-73-91-659-EN-C (1992).
12. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 189.
13. Id.
14. The European Community 1992 and Beyond 25, EC Comm'n, Cat. No. CC-60-91-385-EN-C
(1991). The EEC Treaty authorizes the Council and Commission to issue decisions and recommenda-
tions that do not have the binding force of primary law. A decision is binding only to the parties
to which it is addressed.
15. The members of the Commission are appointed by Member State governments. EEC TREATY,
supra note 3, art. 157(1). The Commissioners are nevertheless required to act independently of their
governments in performing their duties because the Commission represents Community, not national,
interests. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 157(2). Each member of the Commission is responsible
for a specific subject matter within the Commission. The Commission cannot be removed except
as a whole by means of a motion for censure by the European Parliament. Id. art. 144. Under limited
circumstances, the European Court of Justice may retire a commissioner for serious misconduct.
Id. art. 160. The Commission consists of 17 members.
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compel the Commission to draft a proposal. 6 The exclusive power to propose
makes the Commission the power house of the Community when added to the
fact that the Commission also enforces Community legislation. "7
The Commission submits its proposal to the Council.' 8 The Council performs
the traditional function of a legislature-it passes laws-but is always dependent
on the Commission initiative, which is unusual in the traditional separation of
powers scheme.' 9 The Council always meets in closed session.
Voting on the Commission's proposals occurs by simple majority unless the
Treaty requires otherwise. 20 The critical question becomes whether the passage
of a proposal requires a unanimous vote or a qualified majority. The voting
method specified has political implications. Each Member State possesses a prede-
termined number of votes.2' If a unanimous vote is required, a single country
possesses a veto power over the proposed legislation. To obtain a qualified major-
ity, fifty-four of the total of seventy-six votes are required. The qualified majority
vote provides regional balance and dependency to the legislative process. For
example, when a qualified majority vote is required, the northern European
members cannot pass a proposal without the support of at least one of the southern
European members. Moreover, the biggest four or five members cannot pass a
proposal over the objection of the smaller ones.
Before the Council may reach a final decision on a proposal, the Council
must seek the European Parliament's participation in varying degrees.22 The
16. Id. art. 152. The Commission does consult with representatives of Member States and with
committees of the Parliament to aid in formulating proposals. On occasion, the Commission may
submit orientation papers to the Council for debate for feedback on the proposal. Werner Ungerer,
Institutional Consequences of Broadening and Deepening the Community: The Consequences for the
Decision-Making Process, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 71, 72-73 (1993).
17. The sheer size of the Commission is also staggering. The Commission and the staff now
consist of approximately 15,000 people. Most lobbying activities in the Community center around
the Commission. On lobbying activities in the Community, see Odile Prevot, A New Concern in
Europe: Lobbyists, The Merchants of Influence, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 305 (1992).
18. The Council members represent national governments. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 146.
The Council presidency rotates at six-month intervals in a preset order. Id. The Council consists of
12 members. The Council of Ministers is easily confused with the European Council. The European
Council consists of the Heads of State that meet twice a year in summits to discuss broad policy for
the Community.
19. Carl 0. Lenz, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, 14 EUR. L. REV. 127,
129 (1989).
20. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 148(1).
21. The current division of votes is as follows: Belgium (5), Denmark (3), Germany (10), Greece
(5), France (10), Ireland (3), Italy (10), Luxembourg (2), Netherlands (5), Portugal (5), Spain (8),
and United Kingdom (10). Id. art. 148(2).
22. The members of the Parliament are elected by universal suffrage. Each country selects a
specified number of representatives to the Parliament. Members of Parliament serve a five-year
term; they are divided into political groups in the assembly hall.
Prior to the most recent parliamentary election in June 1994, the division of members was as
follows: Belgium (24), Denmark (16), Germany (81), Greece (24), France (81), Ireland (15), Italy
(81), Luxembourg (6), Netherlands (25), Portugal (24), Spain (60), and the United Kingdom (81).
Id. art. 138.
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Parliament, however, has only limited rights to influence the Commission's or
Council's work. The first right is the right to give nonbinding opinions on legisla-
tive proposals.23 In some cases, this is the power to delay the passage of the
legislation in question until the proposal has been amended to reflect the views
of the Parliament, because the Council cannot legally pass a law without having
received the Parliament's opinion.24
The second right is the right to question. The Parliament may require the
members of the Commission and the Council to answer, in writing or orally,
questions on Community issues, 25 thus facilitating a dialogue between the Commu-
nity organs. The oral question-and-answer sessions, or question times, between
a member of parliament and an executive are a time-honored tradition in many
European countries. The question times allow members of the Parliament to
"obtain information and confirmation of positions from the Commission or Coun-
cil, but rarely fresh action or statements of position.,
26
The third right of the Parliament to influence Community legislation is the
right to participate in the cooperation procedure.27 The Single European Act of
1987 amended the Treaty of Rome to introduce the cooperation procedure as the
first increase in the powers of the Parliament. The cooperation procedure extends
to selected subject areas, such as the areas of social policy and research,28 which
are not the areas where the most significant decisions of the Community are
made. For this reason, the cooperation procedure has come under attack for
failing to provide the Parliament with any meaningful power over important
subject areas.
Under the cooperation procedure, the Commission drafts a proposal and sub-
mits it to the Council, which seeks the opinion of the Parliament. Once the Council
has received the Parliament's opinion, the Council adopts a common position
by a qualified majority29 and submits the common position back to the Parliament
Because of German unification, the number of members to be elected in the June 1994 election
was increased to 567. If Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Austria join the European Community next
year, there will be more than 600 members of Parliament.
23. Id. art. 145.
24. Case 138/79, Roquette Fr~res SA v. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3333.
25. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 140.
26. H.G. Thomas, Democracy and 1992-Integration Without Accountability?, X(2) LIVERPOOL
L. REV. 185, 187 (1988) (citing J. FITZMAURICE, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 150 (1978)). The
question time has become popular. Since 1973 each part-session of the Parliament has included a
question time. EMILE NOEL, WORKING TOGETHER-THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY 27 (1991), updated and printed in 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 514 (1992). In 1989 the
Commission replied to 581 questions during oral question time as well as to 1711 written questions
from the Parliament. Id.
27. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 149.
28. The cooperation procedure applies to measures adopted, for example, under art. 130E (re-
gional development fund), art. 130Q(2) (research and development), art. 118A (health and safety
of workers), art. 57 (mutual recognition of diplomas), art. 7 (nondiscrimination on grounds of
nationality), and art. 48 (freedom of movement of workers).
29. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 149(2)(a).
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for a second reading. 30 The Parliament may approve the position or remain silent,
whereafter the Council is free to pass the proposal. If the Parliament rejects the
common position, the Council can still pass the legislation by a unanimous vote.31
If the Parliament proposes amendments, the Commission considers the amend-
ments and then forwards the amended proposal to the Council. If the Commission
did not adopt some of the Parliament's amendments, the Council may adopt such
amendment only by a unanimous vote.32 Otherwise, the Council may adopt the
33amended proposal by a qualified majority.
The net result under the cooperation procedure is that the Council may pass
the legislation over the objection of the Parliament if the Council can reach
unanimity on the issue. In addition, in areas where the cooperation procedure
does not apply, the Parliament remains a consulting and advisory body. The
Parliament has repeatedly demanded the right to participate in the Community
legislative process on an equal footing with the Commission and Council. 34 Until
the Maastricht Treaty, the demands have been unsuccessful.
B. THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AFTER THE MAASTRICHT AMENDMENTS
The Maastricht Treaty introduces a co-decision procedure that increases the
Parliament's involvement in the legislative process.3 5 Under the co-decision pro-
cedure, the Commission submits its proposal to both the Council and the Parlia-
ment.36 Once the Council receives the Parliament's opinion, the Council adopts
a common position that it submits back to the Parliament. The Parliament has
three months to respond. If the Parliament approves or remains silent, the Council
may adopt the proposal. If the Parliament proposes amendments, the amended
proposal must then be submitted to both the Commission and the Council for
their opinions. The Council may adopt the amended proposal by a qualified
majority if the Commission has not issued a negative opinion on the amended
proposal. If the Commission issues a negative opinion on the amended proposal,
the Council may still pass the proposal, but only if the Council can pass the
proposal unanimously.
If the Parliament intends to reject the proposed legislation, the Council may
30. Id. art. 149(2)(b).
31. Id. art. 149(2)(c).
32. Id. art. 149(2)(d).
33. Independently of the cooperation procedure, the Parliament may request the opening of a
conciliation with the Council when the two institutions disagree on a Commission proposal that would
have a significant financial impact.
34. D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 233
(4th ed. 1987).
35. MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. 189b. For a detailed analysis of the co-decision
power, see Pierre Mathijsen, The Power of Co-Decision of the European Parliament Introduced by
the Maastricht Treaty, B. TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 81 (1993).
36. MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. 189 (laying out the requirements of the co-decision
procedure).
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convene a Conciliation Committee to work out the differences between the Coun-
cil and the Parliament.37 The committee has six weeks to find common ground.
If an acceptable compromise is reached, the Parliament and Council must then
approve the proposal. If conciliation fails, the Council by a qualified majority
can unilaterally adopt the original common position it drafted. However, the
Parliament has the power to prevent the passage by an absolute majority of its
members. This authority is significant because it gives the Parliament an effective
veto power.
As was true with the cooperation procedure, the new co-decision procedure also
applies to selected subject areas. These areas include: the multiannual framework
research programs; general programs on environmental protection; the develop-
ment of trans-European networks; education; public health; culture; measures
relating to consumer protection; free movement of workers; and some aspects
of the right of establishment and the internal market.3" Some of these areas are
new competencies of the Community as enlarged by the Maastricht Treaty. None
of these areas are the core competencies of the Community. Despite the fact
that the procedure applies only in limited areas, it is a welcome expansion of
Parliament's powers.3 9 The Parliament has already exercised its new power under
the co-decision procedure. In March 1994, a Conciliation Committee was formed
under the co-decision procedure to consolidate the differences of the Parliament
and the Council over the research budget for the next four years.
40
In addition to the new co-decision procedure, Maastricht expands the areas
where the cooperation procedure applies.4 ' The Maastricht Treaty also gives the
Parliament new powers of assent in several areas. First, the President and other
members of the Commission will now be subject as a body to a vote of approval
by the Parliament.42 The Commission's term of service increases from four to
five years to coincide with the term of the member of Parliament. 43 The make-up of
the Commission may now become a political issue in the European parliamentary
election campaigns."a Second, the assent power is introduced into the foreign
affairs of the Community. Previously, the Parliament had the power of assent
37. Id. art. 189b(2)(c).
38. For a detailed list of the areas that will require the co-decision procedure, see Maastricht-
The Position of the European Parliament, EUR. PARL. Doc. (Annex I) at 11 (Notice to Members)
[hereinafter Position of the Parliament].
39. With respect to the co-decision power, one comment stated: "The right of veto that comes
with co-decision is the key. Use it too often and the parliament will be judged frivolous; use it too
seldom and the parliament will be ignored. Use it just right, as a threat as well as a reality, and the
parliament will be taken seriously." Europe 's Feeble Parliament, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 1994, at 15.
40. James Landale, EU: European Deputies Wield New Power, TIMES, Mar. 5, 1994, available
in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS database. The Parliament and the Council disagree on the overall amount
of the budget, how the money should be shared, and by whom. Id.
41. For a detailed list of these areas, see Position of the Parliament, supra note 38, at 12.
42. MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. 158(2).
43. Id. art. 158.
44. European Union 27, EC Comm'n, Cat. No. CC-74-92-265-EN-C (1992).
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in accession of new members to the Community and in association agreements
with non-Community nations. 5 Under the Maastricht Treaty, the Parliament's
assent is required for all international treaties that have substantial financial or
contractual implications for the Community.6
The European Parliament slowly but surely gains more say in the Community
legislative process. The original, purely advisory and consulting role of the Parlia-
ment has increased with the cooperation and co-decision procedures, which con-
stitutes a significant step toward reducing the democratic deficit of the Community
and increases the participation of the Parliament in the legislative process.
One of the major shortcomings of the current, as well as the Maastricht, scheme
of democracy in the Community is the lack of political accountability. The Com-
mission consists of members appointed by national governments, and the Council
represents the executive branch of a Member State government. 47 The Parliament
is the only directly elected institution in the Community, yet it is not empowered
to effectively scrutinize the two other, more powerful, Community institutions.
The Parliament can reach the Commission only by dismissing it as a whole
through the motion for censure. 48 The new power to approve the Commission
as a whole does not reach individual commissioners. Doubts as to one commis-
sioner may not be enough for the Parliament to gain a majority to deny the
approval of the entire Commission.
Another shortcoming is that the current role of the Parliament is complicated.
Depending on the subject matter of the proposal, the Parliament may have one
of three roles: the Parliament may be able to give an opinion; the Parliament
may be able to initiate the cooperation procedure; or the Parliament may be
able to initiate the co-decision procedure. Many subject matters may not lend
themselves to easy classification between the relevant subject matters and disputes
over which procedure is to be employed are foreseeable. 9
Further, the co-decision and cooperation procedures reach only a limited num-
ber of Community competencies. The European Parliament strongly criticized
this shortcoming of the current system and the Maastricht Treaty in its official
position on the Maastricht Treaty.5 ° The current legislative process in the Commu-
45. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, arts. 237-238.
46. MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. 228. Some additional powers the Parliament gains
under the Maastricht Treaty include the right to request the Commission to draft a proposal on a
specific subject matter. Id., art. 138b. The power to request, however, is not equivalent to a power
to compel the Commission to draft the desired proposal. The monopoly over proposals remains with
the Commission. Finally, the vision of a true people's Europe may be facilitated by the new powers
of the Parliament to appoint an ombudsman and to receive petitions from Community citizens. Id.
arts. 138d-138e. These issues are discussed in part IV of this article.
47. Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
48. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 144.
49. Rend Barents, The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations on the Legal Basis of
Community Legislation, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 85, 89 (1993).
50. Position of the Parliament, supra note 38, at Ii.
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nity, even after the Maastricht Treaty, "only insufficiently satisfies the democratic
constitutional principle according to which all public power issues from the
people." 5"
The European Parliament should be raised to a more equal playing field with the
two more powerful institutions.52 The Community needs an effective Parliament to
scrutinize the Commission's and Council's work. All legislation could be ap-
proved by the Parliament, for example, by extending the co-decision procedure to
all areas of Community competence. Such a change may slow down the legislative
process of the Community, but would increase participation and ensure that a
larger number of interests will be represented at the Community level. The French
and Danish vetoes on the Treaty indicated a popular dissatisfaction with the vision
of an ever closer union. The dissatisfaction is well founded. The Community
has made significant inroads into areas that affect the smallest unit of the Commu-
nity-the individual farmer, small business owner, and the factory worker-and
yet continues to alienate these people by depriving the European Parliament
of a meaningful role in the Community. A directly elected Parliament will be
meaningful only if the Parliament enjoys authority to govern. Increasing the
opportunities of the Parliament to influence the legislative process in a meaningful
way would ensure that a larger group of interests will become represented and
heard at the Community level.
III. Increasing Participation at the National Level: Subsidiarity
The Maastricht Treaty adds the principle of subsidiarity to the EEC Treaty:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States
and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community. 3
In broad outline, subsidiarity divides power between the Community and Member
State governments.54 Subsidiarity is an attempt to clarify which level-national
or supranational-has the final authority on a given issue. The question is similar
to the division of powers between central and local governments in a federal
system.
Subsidiarity is best understood in the larger context of the Maastricht agenda.
The Treaty calls for respect for the national and regional differences in the Com-
51. Ulrich Everling, Reflections on the Structure of the European Union, 29 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 1053, 1074 (1992).
52. Koen Lenaerts, Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community,
28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 11, 20 (1991); see Ungerer, supra note 16, at 78.
53. MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. 3b.
54. For an account of the history of subsidiarity in Europe, see Deborah Z. Cass, The Word
that Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers Within the European
Community, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1107 (1992).
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munity. For example, article F(1) of the Treaty calls for respecting the national
identities of Member States. Article 128(1) calls for the Community's contribution
to the flowering of the cultures and diversity within the Community. The Treaty
also establishes the Committee of Regions to aid the Council in better achieving
the cultural diversity goal in Community measures." Subsidiarity therefore recog-
nizes that certain decisions are better made as close as possible to the citizen.56
The creation of subsidiarity may answer the concerns and resistance of Member
States that fear they will lose their national power and identity to the bandwagon
called European integration.
Subsidiarity has the potential to increase the participation of Member States
in Community agendas that Member States know how to do best: respond to
local concerns. At the same time, subsidiarity ensures the accountability of the
decisionmaker, because the decisionmaker is immediate and close to the public.
The hope is that subsidiarity will safeguard against Community institutions from
unilaterally expanding their power at the expense of national governments.57 The
purpose of this section is to examine the division of powers between the Commu-
nity and Member States and how the division affects Member State participation
in the Community before and after the Maastricht Treaty.
A. CURRENT DIVISION OF POWER BETWEEN COMMUNITY
AND MEMBER STATES
The Treaties of the Community do not distribute powers and competencies
between the Community and Member States. The EEC Treaty established an
economic union to carry out certain tasks and objectives that are listed in the
EEC Treaty. 58 The Community may legally act only to accomplish the enumerated
tasks and objectives, that is it has enumerated or limited powers. Member States
are generally competent to act unless the EEC Treaty provides otherwise. In
55. MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. 198a. The Committee consists of local and
regional authorities from all Member States. It will have an opportunity to comment on proposed
Community legislation when the EEC Treaty, as amended by the Maastricht Treaty, so requires
and otherwise when the Commission or the Council considers it appropriate. The Committee
may issue an opinion on its own initiative. Id. art. 198c. The Committee's inaugural meeting
was held in March 1994. Chris Porter, Europe's Regions Edge into the Limelight, Reuter
Newswire, Mar. 8, 1994, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS database. Commissioner Bruce
Millan expects that the Committee "could play a key role in tackling the gulf between Europe's
citizens and the bureaucrats of Brussels." Id. Others, such as Jacques Delors, have expressed
a more cautious opinion regarding the potential of the Committee. Id. In short, as a newly
created body within the Community structure, the Committee of Regions will have to prove
itself as a viable and effective body that can and will accomplish its purposes.
56. From Single Market to European Union 21, EC Comm'n, Cat. No. CC-74-92-289-EN-C
(1992).
57. Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier Against 'the Enterprises of Ambiti on"?,
17 EUR. L. REV. 383 (1992).
58. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, arts. 2-3. The Maastricht Treaty will increase the tasks and
objectives of the Treaty of Rome. See MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. 3.
59. Barents, supra note 49, at 85.
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practice, every Community measure must cite the Treaty provision on which
the measure is based. To accomplish the enumerated tasks and objectives, the
Community is authorized to make regulations and directives binding on Member
States. 6° Further, article 235 gives the Community the power to act if the action
is necessary to attain an objective and where the Treaty has not provided for the
necessary powers elsewhere. Article 235 is sometimes referred to as the Necessary
and Proper or Implied Powers Clause.
It is now firmly established that Community legislation is supreme over any
conflicting national legislation, generally because Member States have expressly
agreed that Community legislation is binding on them. In reality, the Community
and Member States often engage in a tug-of-war. Member States have attempted
to block or delay Community legislation by failing to implement duly passed
directives. Conflicts arise over whether the Community acted within its enumer-
ated competencies. The conflict is real. In 1989 alone the Community enacted
5,719 regulations directly applicable in Member States.6'
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has taken an active role in sorting out
the hierarchy between Community and Member-State law. The landmark decision
Van Gend & Loos 62 created the direct effect doctrine: A provision of the EEC
Treaty may have a direct effect in a Member State if the provision is clear and
unconditional, requiring no further legislative intervention by the Member State.
Several provisions of the Treaty of Rome have since been ruled to have a direct
effect.63 Direct effect means that a national of a Member State may rely on the
Treaty provision in national courts against conflicting Member State law.
From direct effect, it was only a short step to the supremacy doctrine. The
ECJ held in Costa v. ENEL: "The transfer by the States from their domestic
legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising
under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights,
against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the
Community cannot prevail.' 64 If there was any confusion left over the place of
national law in the Community legal order, the Simmenthal decision made it clear
that provisions of Community law take precedence over national laws and "render
automatically inapplicable any conflicting provisions of current national law.
65
60. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 189.
61. Noel, supra note 26, at 13.
62. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R.
1, 1963 C.M.L.R. 105.
63. Articles 7, 9, 10, 12, 13(2), 16, 30, 36, 37, 48, 52, 53, 59(1), 62, 60(3), 67, 76, 79, 80,
85, 86, 90, 92(1), 93(3), 95, 96, 106, 119, and 221 have been ruled to have a direct effect. See
Andrew C. Geddes, The Incoming Tide: The Impact of EEC Law, 141 NEW LAW J. 1330 (1991);
Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 1964 C.M.L.R. 425; RALPH H. FoLsoM, EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 73-74 (1991). Some articles have qualifications attached for them
to be directly applicable.
64. 1964 E.C.R. at 593.
65. Case 106/77, Administrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, 1978 E.C.R.
629, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263.
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The supremacy doctrine is now firmly entrenched in the Community legal
order.66 Member States have transferred their sovereignty and competence to the
Community institutions. Once the Community legislates, the legislation becomes
supreme and preempts national law. It is easy to understand why national govern-
ments feel overwhelmed by the Community power while watching their own
power fade away. The Community's effective enforcement system of compliance
also adds to the arsenal of Community against Member States.67
Much of the frustration of national legislators may also be traced to the compli-
cated scheme that the Community has created for the relationship between Com-
munity and national law. When a national legislature discusses a new bill, it has
to decide whether the bill is in any way affected by existing Community treaty
provisions, regulations, or directives. Existing national law must constantly be
updated when the Community passes new laws to ensure compliance with Com-
munity law. The pressure to implement directives by the deadlines set by the
Community adds to the burden. The national legislature must follow the decisions
from the ECJ and act accordingly. 68 Finally, the national legislatures have wit-
nessed an increasing transfer of power and sovereignty to the Community institu-
tions and the resulting imposition of Europe-wide standards that may be poorly
suited to the needs of the particular Member State. Subsidiarity has the potential
to allocate power back to the national level.
B. DIVISION OF POWER AFTER THE MAASTRICHT TREATY AND SUBSIDIARITY
The subsidiarity principle applies if the conditions of article 3b are met. First,
subsidiarity applies only in areas that do not fall within the exclusive competence
of the Community. If a competence is exclusive to the Community, subsidiarity
66. Expanding on the established supremacy and direct effect doctrines, the ECJ has since held
that a direct effect may also be horizontal, i.e., as between private individuals. Case 43/75, Defrenne
v. Sabena, [1976] 1 E.C.R. 455, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 98. Direct effect has also been expanded to
cover regulations (Case 34/73, Variola SpA v. Administrazione Italiana delle Finanze, 1973 E.C.R.
981) and also to some directives (Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, [19751
1 C.M.L.R. 1).
67. In 1990 the ECJ adopted an important addition to the Community's enforcement arsenal.
The Court held that a state may be held liable for damages to an individual for the failure to implement
a directive. Francovich v. Italian Republic, Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, 1991 E.C.R. i-5357, 2 C.M. L.R.
66, discussed in Christopher Greenwood, Case and Comment, Effect of EC Directives in National
Law, 51 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 3, 5 (1992). The Maastricht Treaty will further expand the enforcement
arsenal by providing for a lump sum or penalty payment against a Member State that has failed to
comply with a judgment ordering the state to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty. MAASTRICHT
TREATY, supra note 2, art. 171. Currently, the Commission enforces Community law and has the
right to ensure Member State compliance with Community law, e.g., by taking the noncomplying
state to the ECJ.
68. Every national judge is considered a Community judge and has the power to question the
validity of national laws against Community law. Curtin, supra note 8, at 31. The ability of national
courts to question and strike national laws is foreign to many European legal systems where courts
generally do not review the validity of legislation.
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has no application. The difficulty lies in the failure of the EEC Treaty to specify
which competencies belong exclusively to the Community.
The European Court of Justice has tackled the issue several times. There is
consensus that in areas such as common commercial policy, fisheries policy,
and in areas where the Community has issued comprehensive measures, the
Community enjoys exclusive competency to act.69 On the other hand, the attempt
to divide Community competencies between exclusive and concurrent may be
a futile exercise. 70 Member States have transferred some of their power and
sovereignty to the Community. The principle of supremacy therefore dictates
that in matters transferred to the Community, the Community has exclusive
power. 71 The commentaries to the Draft Treaty on European Union support this
view. If the Community and Member States enjoy concurrent power over a subject
matter, the Member State is authorized to pass measures only until the Community
decides to exercise its concurrent power in the area. 72 After the Community has
decided to act, "the Union's competence is the same as in those cases where it
has exclusive competence and the Member States are not entitled to act except
where the law of the Union grants them the right to adopt implementing mea-
sures." 73 Consequently, once the Community acts, any national measure that
conflicts with the Community measure is rendered ineffective. Conversely, as
long as the Community remains silent, Member States are free to regulate the
area or an aspect of an area not touched by the Community measure.
The second requirement of a subsidiarity imposes conditions on the Communi-
ty's ability to act in areas where Member States have concurrent competence.
The Community can take action only if the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved at the Member State level and can therefore, by
reason of the scale of effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at the
Community level. The Community may act only to perform tasks that are more
efficiently carried out in common than by Member States acting alone.74
The crucial question in interpreting subsidiarity then becomes whether the
objectives of the Community action can better be attained at the Community or
Member State level. The Community, acting to fulfill a competence where Mem-
69. FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI ET AL., THE EUROPEAN UNION TREATY: COMMENTARY ON THE
DRAFT ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON FEBRUARY 14, 1984, at 74 (1986).
70. See, e.g., A.G. Toth, The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, 29 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1079 (1992).
71. Id. at 1080-81.
72. CAPOTORTI, supra note 69, at 77.
73. Id. The German Constitution provided the model for the subsidiarity doctrine and also supports
the view that once the Community acts on any matter falling within its competence, its jurisdiction
over the subject matter is exclusive. Toth, supra note 70, at 73. Article 72 of the German Basic
Law (Grundgesetz) provides that in matters of concurrent power between the federal government
and the Lander, the Lnder shall be able to legislate provided that the federal government does not
avail itself of the power to legislate. CAPOTORTI, supra note 69, at 76 n.6; see also Emiliou, supra
note 57, at 388-90.
74. CAPOTORTI, supra note 69, at 78-79.
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ber States have concurrent competence, must first examine the objective of its
proposed measure. The Community must assure itself that the objective cannot
sufficiently be attained by Member States acting separately. Moreover, the Com-
munity action should have a wide-ranging effect in the Community-for example,
the action should benefit the whole Community. If the Community comes to the
conclusion that the objective, due to its local impact, is sufficiently attained at
the Member State level, the Community should refrain from taking measures.
But the subsidiarity principle is worded vaguely enough that the reverse may
occur. The Community may decide that the time has come to set a Community-
wide standard in the area where Member States have had the power to regulate
separately. Thus, the subsidiarity principle will have a centralizing effect. Much
is left to the discretion of the Community. Indeed, there is substantial disagreement
on whether subsidiarity was intended to have a centralizing or decentralizing
effect: whether subsidiarity transfers power from Member States to the Commu-
nity or whether it transfers power from the Community to the Member States
in situations where subsidiarity applies.
A decentralizing approach to interpreting subsidiarity would increase participa-
tion by Member States. In cases where the action proposed by the Community
is sufficiently achieved at the Member State level, subsidiarity becomes a tool
to increase the flexibility and responsiveness of the entire union to local needs.75
The Community consists of twelve diverse nations where pressing concerns of
purely local nature would otherwise have to yield to Europe-wide standards. An
example of how subsidiarity may increase the Community's flexibility was the
case of London Boroughs decided by the House of Lords of the United Kingdom.76
The House of Lords upheld the London traffic authority's regulation on the basis
of subsidiarity. Article 130R(4) of the EEC Treaty contains a reference to a
principle similar to subsidiarity. The article states that Community should act
with respect to the environment only "to the extent that the objectives can be
attained better at the Community level than at the level of individual Member
States. 77
The London traffic authority had imposed a night prohibition on lorry traffic
to reduce noise and pollution. Exceptions were given to lorries that used a special
silent air brake. The ban was challenged based on Community law. The House
of Lords stated that local authorities are better equipped to deal with the local
environmental problems than are central Community institutions.78 Environmen-
tal protection lies within the concurrent competence of the Community and Mem-
ber States. The House of Lords limited the Community's reach in this area because
75. Eugene D. Cross, Pre-Emption of Member State Law in the European Economic Community:
A Framework for Analysis, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 447, 471 (1992).
76. Regina v. London Boroughs Transport Committee, 1 C.M.L.R. 229 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1989);
see also Emiliou, supra note 57, at 394-95.
77. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 130R(4).
78. Cross, supra note 75, at 394-95.
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the environmental protection of urban London and the local needs are better
analyzed, achieved, and implemented at the local rather than Community level.
Besides the environment, several new competencies of the Community, as
expanded by the Maastricht Treaty,7 9 are prime candidates for the application
of the principle of subsidiarity. The new competencies allow the Community to
promote and contribute to health protection, education, cultures, civil protection,
and tourism, which are closely linked to unique local needs and conditions.
Retaining power over such subject areas at the lowest possible level would ensure
the accountability of the people who make the decisions. The national and regional
diversity of Member States should be respected, and subsidiarity provides the
mechanism to recognize the diversity.
Deferring to the local level would also increase experimentation and creativity
with regulatory solutions to local conditions.80 Only when a dimension of one
of the areas reaches Community-wide proportions does the Community become
the appropriate authority to take measures. An example of such an action is the
push for recognition of educational diplomas between Member States to facilitate
the freedom of movement of workers.
8 1
Whether subsidiarity will become a justiciable issue in the ECJ remains to be
seen. Subsidiarity certainly has the potential to serve as a check and balance in
the power sharing between the Community and Member States. 2 This potential
should be recognized especially in the new competencies that the Maastricht
Treaty creates for the Community. Subsidiarity should become a valuable tool
for Member States to preserve their jurisdiction over local needs and concerns.
Subsidiarity recognizes that Europe should not become rigid and unified in its
structure and that the Community should only deal with those matters that it is
better equipped to deal with than are Member States. 3 Subsidiarity increases
vertical democracy by increasing participation by Member States in their internal
affairs. Subsidiarity seeks an accommodation between uniformity and plurality
in power sharing between the Community and Member States.
4
IV. Increasing Participation at the Grassroots Level
Nationals of Member States are directly affected by Community measures in
everyday situations. Conversely, the French and Danish referendums showed the
79. See MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 3, art. 3; see also Robert Lane, New Community
Competences Under the Maastricht Treaty, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 939 (1993).
80. Cross, supra note 75, at 471.
81. See MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. 57, 31 I.L.M. at 260.
82. It is unlikely, however, that Member States will be able to rely on subsidiarity as a defense
to any Community action for failure to comply with Community law. Too many of the current
competencies of the Community have been so comprehensively regulated by the Community that
these areas may be considered now to be the exclusive domain of the Community, thereby precluding
the application of subsidiarity.
83. European Union, supra note 44, at 11.
84. Cass, supra note 54, at 1135.
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power of the individual to influence Community progress. The Community is no
longer exclusively an economic union. 85 Several new competencies of the Community
bear only an indirect relationship to trade issues. The purpose of this section is to
examine the nature and scope of citizen participation in Community affairs.
The Maastricht Treaty establishes a new element to citizen participation in the
Community: Union citizenship. 86 "Every person holding the nationality of a Member
State shall be a citizen of the Union." 87 However, the status of Union citizenship
is not granted by the Community; instead the citizenship flows from the nationality
of a Member State. Acquisition or loss of Member State citizenship is a prerequisite
to the acquisition or loss of Union citizenship. The Member States retain their
freedom to choose the various criteria that determine their citizenship. 8
The Treaty confers several rights on the new citizen. The first Community
right is the right to move and reside freely within the territory of any Member
State.89 Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, any national of a Member State as well
as accompanying family members were free to move to another state to take up
employment. The national was required to obtain a residence permit valid for
at least five years. 9° Moving to reside in another Member State for purposes
other than employment was limited by the requirement that the individual must
have enough resources not to become a burden on the social security system of
the state. 9' The Maastricht Treaty breaks the connection between the right to
travel and economic criteria-the right to travel is no longer an economic right. 92
The "Eurocitizen" will be able to enjoy the fruits of European integration any-
where in the Community.
The right to travel would not be complete unless accompanied by similar rights
to participate in the political process in the place of residence. Another Community
right established for the European citizen is the right to vote and stand for election
in the Member State where the individual resides under the same conditions
as the nationals of the state. 93 Many Member States will have to amend their
85. The Maastricht Treaty recognized this by deleting the word "Economic" from the name
of the Community. MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. G(A)(1).
86. Id. arts. 8-8e.
87. Id. art. 8.
88. CAPOTORTI, supra note 69, at 37.
89. MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. 8a(1).
90. 1 EC COMMISSION, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET: A COMMON MARKET FOR SERVICES
146 (1992).
91. Id. at 155; see Carlos Closa, The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union,
29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1137 (1992).
92. Closa, supra note 91, at 1142.
93. MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. 8b(l). The Treaty extends the same right to the
European citizen in elections to the European Parliament. All three Community institutions have a
role in implementing detailed regulations on the issue. A proposal for a directive has been issued
detailing the procedure to be followed for the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in a country
in which the Union citizen resides but does not hold nationality. Council Directive 93/109, 1993
O.J. (L 329) 1.
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constitutions to incorporate the mandate of this provision. 94 Traditionally, Euro-
pean nations have reserved the right to political participation exclusively to their
own nationals. The opening up of participation in national politics to "foreigners"
is a radical concept in Europe where national rivalries still persist and nationalism
is strong. Nevertheless, the Union citizenship will facilitate free movement of
workers within the Community, and the accompanying citizenship rights will
make citizen participation more realistic among those who choose to move to
another Member State.
The European citizen will also enjoy the right to petition the European Parlia-
ment and to lodge complaints with the ombudsman.95 The right to petition the
Parliament is conferred in matters within the Community's fields of activity and
that directly affect the individual or a group of individuals.96 The petition may
also be made in association with other citizens. The opinion of the Committee
of Petitions strongly advocates a generous interpretation on the admissibility of
a petition: "There is no reason to exclude matters of general interest on which
the petitioner feels strongly, even where he is not personally affected.' '9 The
right to petition is a recognition of the Parliament's urging in 1989 that every
person should have a right to petition the Parliament.98 The ombudsman is a
time-honored tradition in many European countries, and therefore it is no surprise
that the concept is incorporated into the Community legal order.
The ombudsman is appointed by the Parliament and authorized to receive
complaints concerning instances of maladministration of Community institutions
or bodies. 99 If an instance of maladministration is established, the ombudsman
must refer the matter to the institution involved. -The institution then has three
months to respond. The Parliament will determine the ultimate action to be taken
once the investigation is complete, to The Parliament contemplates that the om-
budsman will cooperate closely with national civil-rights organizations. The right
to petition and to complain to an ombudsman will significantly increase an individ-
ual's opportunity to be heard in the Community.
The main shortcoming of the current Community structure and the Maastricht
Treaty is the absence of a bill of rights.1 'O The reason stems from the fact that
the Community's original mission encompassed only economic and trade issues.
94. European Union, supra note 44, at 23.
95. MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. 8d.
96. Id. art. 138d.
97. Position of the Parliament, supra note 38, at 126.
98. Id. at 125.
99. MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 2, art. 138e. The ombudsman cannot receive complaints
of alleged maladministration of the European Court of Justice or the Court of First Instance acting
in their judicial ro e.
100. Position of the Parliament, supra note 38, at 127.
101. See, e.g., Schermers, The European Communities Bound by Fundamental Human Rights,
27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 249, 252 (1990).
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Resolution of human rights issues was to remain within national legal orders.,O0
Because the competencies of the Community have continued to expand beyond
economic issues, there is no good reason for the absence of a fundamental docu-
ment such as a bill of rights. Currently, protection of human rights in the Commu-
nity is being accomplished by the ECJ. The ECJ has declared that it will review
Community measures in a manner that prevents violations of human rights. 103
The ECJ has drawn on the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as
on the constitutions of the Member States, as the sources for its fundamental rights
jurisprudence. 104 The Court's active role has been endorsed by the European Parlia-
ment, as well as by the Commission and the Council in ajoint declaration.'05 Never-
theless, despite several opportunities, the ECJ has not held the European Conven-
tion legally binding on the Community. The Court will merely draw from the
Convention and Member State constitutions to derive common principles enforce-
able at law, not unlike the selective incorporation approach by the United States
Supreme Court. The Maastricht Treaty supports the selective approach. Article F
of the Treaty calls for the Community to "respect fundamental rights" as guaran-
teed by the European Convention as general principles of Community law.
It is noteworthy that the Draft Treaty on European Union did contain a provision
for fundamental rights. The draft article would have codified the ECJ's approach.
The draft article granted every person the fundamental rights and freedoms de-
rived in particular from the "common principles of the Constitutions of the
Member States and from the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. "' 06 The Parliament listed the failure of the
final draft of the Maastricht Treaty to adopt any form of fundamental rights as
a major shortcoming of the Maastricht Treaty. 0 7 Any such protection will now
result from piecemeal litigation in the ECJ. 0 A written Community bill of rights
would help provide the necessary criteria forjudicial review of Community action.
102. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the
European Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights Within the Legal Order
of the European Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (1986).
103. Id. at 1105.
104. Dallen, Jr., An Overview of European Community Protection of Human Rights, with Some
Special References to the U.K., 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 761, 771 (1990). Each Community
member is a member to the European Convention. The legal basis of the ECJ's use of the Convention
is subject to criticism. Today, the issue may be moot due to the Court's declaration that it will refer
to the Convention whenever a human rights issue is presented before the Court. Weiler, supra note
102, at 1135.
105. Dallen, supra note 104, at 781.
106. CAPOTORTI, supra note 69, at 39 (citing art. 4 of the draft treaty).
107. Position of the Parliament, supra note 38, at iv.
108. See, e.g., Cases 97-99/87, Dow Chemical Iberica SA v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 3165,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 410 (discussing art. 8 of the European Convention and the inviolability of home);
Case 27/88, Orkem SA v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 3301 (discussing the European Convention
and the right not to incriminate oneself in a noncriminal procedure under Community and Member
State laws); Case 236/87, Bergemann v. Bundesanstalt ffir Arbeit, 1988 E.C.R. 5125, [19901
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The primary purpose of any bill of rights is to protect the individual against
official misuse of power.'09
On the Member State level an individual may claim rights conferred by Commu-
nity law through several remedies. Directly applicable Community legislation
can be relied on in courts as against anyone. After the decision in Francovich, "0
failure of a Member State to implement a directive may give an individual a right
to claim damages from the state if certain conditions are met. Citizens will also
benefit from lobbying their parliaments on speeding the implementation of a
directive. All of these activities require information on the development in the
Community. A Member State would be wise to invest in educating their nationals
through information campaigns and in training a well-informed legal profession.
A well-informed and knowledgeable citizenry is a prerequisite for grassroots
participation to work in the Community.
V. Conclusion
As the power of the Community increases, so do the concerns of those who
believe that the Community no longer adequately represents their interests. It
may be time to stop and listen to the voices of dissatisfaction to ensure that the
goal of a unified Europe becomes a reality. A unified Europe will be the result
of increased opportunities to participate in Community affairs so that Community
institutions will once again enjoy the legitimacy they need to continue creating
a unified Europe.
I C.M.L.R. 525 (discussing the European Convention art. 8 and the protection of family in the
Community and Member States); Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, 1988 E.C.R.
2085, [1989] 3 C.M.L.R. 113 (discussing art. 10 of the European Convention-freedom of expres-
sion-in the Community); Case 222/86, UNECTEF v. Heylens, 1987 E.C.R. 4097, [1989] 1
C.M.L.R. 901 (discussing free access to employment as a Community human-rights principle in
accordance with arts. 6 and 13 of the European Convention); Case 257/85, Dufay v. European
Parliament, 1987 E.C.R. 1561 (right to fair trial of art. 6 of the European Convention recognized
as Community right).
109. On the national level, an individual may naturally rely on the human-rights protections of
the national constitution. A national may also use the European Court and Commission of Human
Rights to pursue a remedy. However, the European Court and Commission of Human Rights operate
outside the Community framework. They are not Community institutions.
110. See supra note 67.
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